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Although environmental ethics is a young and dynamically developing field 
concerned with the human relationship to the non-human world, some core 
concerns and questions can be identified as having shaped its broadly 
pluralistic discourse. One main strand of thought has centered around the 
axiology of nature, in particular around the issue of the intrinsic value of nature, 
which includes questions of the ontological status of value, rights, and duties 
that might apply in different ways to a variety of things. The axiological 
questions are necessarily intertwined with those related to the meaning of 
nature and any related or contrasting classes or concepts, such as culture or 
civilization. A second set of questions relates to the status of the discipline itself, 
and the role philosophers might play in addressing the problems of global 
environmental change. Due to a perceived failure by some of environmentalism 
as a movement for collective action, various proposals have been raised 
suggesting a theoretical re-orientation of the discipline from one that focuses 
on overly abstract metaphysical and metaethical questions toward real-world 
problems and policy making. A third group of questions, which emerges from 
the ongoing decentralization of environmental philosophy, seeks to link 
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concerns about economic, social, and environmental inequalities and justice 
under a comprehensive theoretical framework, and seeks to address conflicts 
between environmental, social, and economic values and goals. By way of 
introducing the essays that make up this special issue of Ethics in Progress, we 
will comment on each of these, beginning with a discussion of the evolution 
and state of the discipline. A central theme in all of this is our belief that 
interdisciplinary efforts are crucial to the growth of environmental ethics and 
for applying it to questions of sustainability. This conviction is reflected as well 
in the essays collected herein.  
The importance of considering ethically and politically laden questions 
from an interdisciplinary perspective3 arises primarily due to the fact that 
environmental problems are so thoroughly integrated with other issues (most 
notably, economic and social matters) that solving them in isolation only raises 
or exacerbates problems elsewhere. For example, setting aside tillable land to 
provide protected habitat for threatened ground birds might raise the cost of 
food, a situation felt most sharply by those already economically marginalized. 
Or similarly, turning to hydroelectric power to curb carbon emissions can 
permanently destroy both aquatic systems and the means by which local people 
make a living. Whatever the answers, the various issues cannot be separated, 
and philosophy done with the aim of connecting to real-world problems must 
take this fact into account. By drawing on a wide array of disciplines and 
understandings, there is hope that we can better understand real-world issues 
that are grounded in multiple cultural, historical, and social conditionings 
present both in societal belief systems and scientific and analytic inquiry. A 
better awareness of the conditions that underlie and constitute discourses that 
are used in environmental debates is crucial for developing more meaningful 
and efficacious understandings and policies that are rooted in the past yet 
oriented toward the future. That a workable project of environmental ethics—
one in which philosophers participate more fully in public discourse—must be 
grounded in a robust interdisciplinarity means that theorists must become 
better versed in fields outside of their discipline. At a minimum, this entails 
becoming more interdisciplinary as one engages in philosophy itself; but 
additionally, academic philosophers have increasingly moved beyond just 
acquainting themselves with the ideas of, say, ecological and economic theory, 
to becoming more fully engaged in direct conversations with practitioners in 
those fields and in policy making. They are co-writing articles and books, 
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attending inter- and multi-disciplinary conferences, and are serving on policy 
boards and committees. The recognition that environmental ethics—like 
medical or legal ethics—must not operate in a vacuum or risk becoming self-
isolating and ill-informed has emerged slowly, but surely, since the founding of 
the discipline. 
A Brief History of Environmental Ethics and its Role in Public 
Discourse 
Environmental ethics as a subfield of philosophy grew out of practical concerns 
about nonhuman nature in the context of the global ecological crisis and is not 
much more than four decades old. This is not to say earlier philosophers had 
ignored questions regarding the world we inhabit or how we are variously 
related to, part of, or situated in that world. However, efforts directed toward 
developing a new field of inquiry focused on expanding the moral community 
to include nonhuman nature4 and were intended to counter the traditional, 
individualistic, and narrow focus of classical ethical approaches that 
emphasized human character and actions only as these affected other people. 
Insofar as human beings were taken to have obligations toward the natural 
world, these were indirect, minimal, and grounded in direct duties only to each 
other (or to God) and not on any moral worth that plants, animals, or 
ecosystems might have in themselves. Contemporary environmental ethics,5 in 
contrast, is founded on the need to extend and take more seriously moral 
responsibility toward the nonhuman world, or to put it more broadly, on the 
inclusion of nonhuman nature in ethical reflection. Thus, the primary focus in 
the field, especially in its early decades, has been that of coming to better 
understand the moral status of, and our obligations to, the variety of nonhuman 
entities from individual plants and animals to wholes such as ecosystems and 
species.6 
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That the discipline of environmental ethics, per se, is a fairly recent 
development does not deny the long tradition of writers outside of philosophy 
who contributed greatly to our understandings of nature and our proper 
relationship with it in ways that are more akin to what we find in 
contemporary environmental ethics than in the canonical philosophical 
tradition. In fact, many writers outside the mainstream of Western philosophy 
are regularly cited by today’s environmental ethicists as their intellectual 
forebears, and represents one way in which the discipline has always been, at 
least minimally, interdisciplinary. In the American context, for example, Henry 
David Thoreau (1817-1862) expressed concern with the extent of human-
caused change to his native southern New England, arguing that humans are 
“part and parcel” of the natural world and that only through intimate 
connection with the natural can one escape the conforming—and if unchecked, 
the degrading—effects of civilization (1993 [1862]). Following similarly the 
Romantic movement’s reconceptualization of the human-nature relationship, 
John Muir (1838-1914) believed that in nature one could be closest to the 
divine. He explicitly rejected the common view that nature exists solely for 
human benefit, saying, “How narrowly we selfish, conceited creatures are in 
our sympathies! [H]ow blind to the rights of all the rest of creation!” (1991 
[1916]). Ecologist and forester Aldo Leopold (1887-1948)—also strongly 
influencing contemporary environmental philosophy, especially through the 
work of J. Baird Callicott—argued for the protection of ecosystems and their 
constitutive parts in an ethical sense: he expressed a need to shift from mere 
economic valuations to internalizing a sense of duty to the natural world, which 
begins by recognizing that we are neither distinct from nor superior to those 
entities we too frequently treat as mere objects for our use (1987 [1949]). The 
sense of moral responsibility toward nature (a kind of ecological conscience) is 
grounded in an ecological and evolutionary perspective regarding the human 
place in the world. Although often less celebrated, there were important women 
thinkers too. In her influential 1962 book, Silent Spring, biologist Rachel Carson 
(1907-1964) wrote about the disastrous ecological effects of the insecticide 
DDT. Her work spurred wide public debate about society’s blind faith in, and 
overreliance on, technology as the tool through which we interact with the 
world around us.   
These works strongly influenced the environmental movement as it 
developed and gained strength in the later decades of the last century. As 
heralded as these authors have become, however, they represented nonetheless 
a minority tradition in society against which powerful interests have long 
pushed. In the early twentieth century, for example, arguments to dam a pristine 
California mountain valley, near to and resembling the famed Yosemite Valley, 
overcame Muir’s public pleas for “higher” (and less destructive) aesthetic and 
spiritual uses of the valley than as a water tank for San Francisco (Muir 1988 
[1912], 197). Some fifty years later, for her position on DDT Carson was 




attacked by powerful corporate leaders who disparaged her character and 
ability as a scientist.7 But by her time, public perception had begun to swing 
towards greater awareness of environmental problems and the failures of 
traditional ethics, the blind faith in technology, and a too often reckless public 
policy with regard to the natural world. 
The works of each of these authors—as well as countless other 
authors, poets, artists, theologians, and scholars from around the world, well-
known and otherwise—are now taught with reverence in many grade schools 
through universities. More to our point here, the contemporary field of 
environmental ethics (especially as it has taken shape in the English-speaking 
world), and environmentalism more broadly, owes them an enormous debt. 
From them are drawn various possible alternatives to the common Western 
view that nature’s value comes only from how it can be used to further 
immediate, and often merely economic, human interests, and that knowledge 
about the world is to further our control and effective use of it. To be sure, 
environmental ethicists disagree amongst themselves on key questions 
regarding the moral status and value of plants, animals, species, and 
ecosystems, but their willingness to challenge traditional views and to at least 
consider alternative models of the human-nature relationship (empirically, 
conceptually, and ethically) grows from the ideas of their intellectual and 
artistic predecessors—and, of course, from the growing cultural environmental 
awareness since the 1960s and 70s.  
Regardless of how much theoretical disagreement exists, the men and 
women whose work created and sustains the discipline of environmental 
ethics exhibit a deep, shared concern for, and an intimate connection with, the 
natural world. As citizens of developed countries have become in recent decades 
more conscious of what our actions are doing to the natural world around us, 
academic philosophers wondered whether they could add to the growing 
conversations qua philosophers. Is there a role for academic philosophy in our 
efforts to address pressing ecological problems? What might philosophers 
contribute to our global efforts to find solutions to the environmental crisis? 
Despite the suspicion many felt from some of their traditionally-minded 
colleagues that “applied” philosophy was a watered down philosophy, people 
such as Holmes Rolston III, Richard Sylvan (Routley), Eugene Hargrove, and J. 
Baird Callicott (to name only a few) ultimately changed—along with those 
working in medical ethics, bioethics, animal liberation, and the like—how 
many in the field have come to view the role of philosophers. No longer would 
philosophy be limited to intellectual debates removed by several steps of 
abstraction from real-world concerns; philosophers could, and would, engage in 
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live cultural debates regarding ethics and policy.8 As James Rachels puts it: 
“Suddenly academic philosophers began to write about such matters as 
abortion, racial and sexual discrimination, civil disobedience, economic 
injustice, war, and even the treatment of nonhuman animals. It was a startling 
about-face for thinkers who, only a few years before, had agreed that ‘A 
philosopher is not a parish priest or Universal Aunt or Citizens’ Action 
Bureau’” (2012, 455). That is not to say that environmental and other more 
practically-oriented areas of investigation displaced other concerns in the 
discipline, or that philosophy historically has not strongly influenced our 
cultural beliefs and understandings—it clearly has. But the move by some in the 
discipline to connect with public issues has reminded many that philosophers 
could potentially make important contributions to pressing contemporary 
issues.  
Nevertheless, we do not wish here to overstate the case. The discipline 
of environmental ethics remains focused largely on fairly abstract questions—
e.g., the meaning and proper attribution of intrinsic value to non-human 
entities and the social construction of wilderness—that are not often (in 
contrast to their more mundane and practical iterations) the direct concern of 
activists, policy makers, or citizens more generally. The role of the philosopher 
qua philosopher in society might continue to be of a fairly narrowly 
circumscribed sort in this regard. It is important to note that, as Włodzimierz 
Tyburski points out, one important role of the humanities is to supplement 
with an axio-normative element what we learn from environmental and 
economic science (1990, 9). Admittedly, a good deal of what philosophers do is 
rather abstract and the ability to engage with the arguments and positions 
advanced does require significant academic training. It is our view, however, 
that the more the discipline can be made accessible to non-philosophers, the 
more effective the discipline of philosophy can be in its participation in 
democratic discourse. This being said, it would be unreasonable to judge the 
value of philosophy based solely on the extent to which it has direct or 
immediate impact. After all, much of the published research in the sciences and 
social sciences, where practical application is more obviously likely and 
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expected, does not directly inform public debate or policy. But this is, as with 
philosophy, largely because the work of academic researchers a) depends upon 
whole collections of complex models, concepts, and methods, b) is often focused 
on rather narrow questions that become part of the accumulated 
understanding of a discipline that then does have more practical effects, and c) 
is not a final answer on a question, but one contribution that will then ideally 
go through a process of being challenged, modified, and sometimes even 
rejected. Often the very difficult, abstract questions about concepts and 
arguments involve further matters of complex metaphysical, epistemological, 
and ethical evaluation, which themselves require careful analytic analysis. 
Despite the abstract and complex nature of its work, however, philosophical 
inquiry does have an important and growing role to play in our global efforts to 
address environmental problems: philosophy excels at sifting through difficult, 
but important, concepts, models, and arguments that ultimately do have 
ramifications for public debate and policy.   
Axiology of Nature: The Problem of Intrinsic Value 
One example of environmental ethicists engaging with an issue intimately 
connected to contemporary environmentalism and social discourse is the 
continuing and decades-long debate on the concept of intrinsic value 
(sometimes also called “inherent value”). Axiological reflection—which seeks in 
this context to better understand and describe sources and holders of value in 
the natural world, as well as corresponding duties intended to protect or 
advance this value—has played a crucial role in the dynamic development of 
environmental ethics as a discipline from its beginnings.9 The concern over the 
intrinsic value of nature has become a predominant focus of emerging non-
anthropocentric environmental ethics. As John O’Neill notes, the task of 
justifying and ascribing intrinsic value to nonhuman beings or entities (such as 
species or ecosystems) has become the Holy Grail for many environmental 
philosophers: “To hold an environmental ethics is to hold that non-human 
beings and states of affairs in the natural world have intrinsic value” (1993, 8). 
Many environmental philosophers will disagree with this claim due to doubts 
about the usefulness or even coherence of the concept, believing the focus and 
motives of the discipline to lie elsewhere. Nonetheless, a survey of the literature 
makes it clear that, for better or worse, the focus on intrinsic value has 
dominated the philosophical discussion since the beginning, even as 
environmental ethics continues to grow more complex and diverse.  
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One reason for the focus on axiological issues is the conviction by many 
that the possession of intrinsic value has serious implications for decision 
making (both on the macro and micro levels): an entity that possesses intrinsic 
value, it is thought, must be taken into moral and political consideration by 
moral agents and policy makers in ways that go beyond purely human-
oriented concerns. Although the specific language of “intrinsic value” is not 
necessarily a regular part of citizens’, activists’, or policy makers’ lexica, the idea 
it captures is commonplace.  
The standard account of intrinsic value refers to the value something 
possesses beyond its potential “instrumental value” (i.e., something’s “use” or 
“extrinsic” value) to someone or something else.10 Often, conceptualizations of 
intrinsic value begin with how we think about ourselves and other people—
each as valuable independently of his or her usefulness to others—and is 
extended then to cover other things: individual animals (e.g., our pets, livestock, 
and research animals) or plants, and perhaps collections or systems of things, 
such as ecosystems, species, or even landscapes. The claim that song birds, for 
instance, have value beyond their use value to us or other valuers seems to 
entail that we cannot act just however we wish but somehow must consider 
their well-being or interests. Questions immediately arise in public discourse 
when someone makes such a claim about song birds, previously unnoticed 
minnows, a lowly and rare cactus, and the like: Why should anyone agree that 
this or that organism should matter in my moral deliberations? What precisely 
is it about this cactus, or any cactus, that requires me to pay attention to how 
my actions, and public policy more generally, affect it? After all, it seems to 
have no identifiable interests in the same way that a person or other intelligent 
animal does. It is not conscious; it is not sentient: it does not care what happens 
to it. Further, even if it does have something like intrinsic value, it is not clear 
how to consider this fact alongside or in counter position to deeply felt human 
interests. Should they, for example, count for something like the same weight? 
It is not clear what that could even mean when the “interests” involved—if the 
word can be used coherently with regard to a cactus—seem of a quite different 
sort.  
The notion of, or at least the use or emphasis on, intrinsic value has also 
been challenged by environmental pragmatists who argue that the focus on 
overly abstract metaphysical concerns, such as the ontological status of intrinsic 
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value, has little appeal or conceptual meaning for the public, and as a result it 
contributes to the failure of academic environmental philosophy to affect global 
change (see Light & Katz 1996). It is not clear, however, that unfamiliarity with 
the technical jargon of the philosopher prevents laypeople from having or using 
some basic notion of intrinsic value—or more precisely, some basic, sometimes 
conflicting, and even potentially inconsistent notion. The view that there is 
something more valuable in or about nonhuman entities than can be captured 
as units of utility or monetary notation to be traded against other quantifiable 
human interests is commonly held (O’Neill et al. 2008). Against attempts to 
quantify people’s preferences on the single scale of monetary value, Andrew 
Brennon argues that “market prices do not seem to match people’s normal 
perceptions of value,” which reject the idea that one sort of value (instrumental, 
monetary, etc.) can be stretched to cover the whole variety of things we value 
(2003, 520). In fact, laypeople value nature (and other things too) in both 
instrumental and intrinsic ways (McShane 2009). In a study assessing the 
extent to which intrinsic value theories of nature are accepted and 
acknowledged outside of academic circles, Butler and Acott (2007) surveyed 
employees of twenty landowning organizations (both conservation and non-
conservation groups) in England. Their results show that 80% of those 
surveyed embrace the idea that the environment possesses intrinsic value, 
although their conceptualizations and understanding of what intrinsic value is, 
or means, varies. Nevertheless, despite the plurality of views, two universal 
imperatives were apparent in the respondents’ opinions: (1) “There ought to 
be some limit to the extent to which we may justifiably modify nature and we 
have a duty not to exceed that limit”; and (2) “We have a duty to have regard to 
nature’s intrinsic value in our dealings with nature” (Butler & Acott 2007, 455). 
The discussion of intrinsic value by philosophers is not, then, removed 
from larger cultural understandings and debates; it is not a mere abstract 
philosophical notion. Further, the various views developed have been, 
expectedly, quite varied. As mentioned above, some thinkers have extended, in 
a fairly straightforward way, moral standing (the quality of being a necessary 
object of moral agents’ attention) from the paradigmatic case of human beings 
to other intelligent, sentient, conscious beings. However, even here there is 
disagreement on the proper grounds of extension—sentience being widely 
seen as the defining mark, with more or less restrictive accounts also 
advanced—and how to then weigh competing interests or Kantian-like duties 
in cases of conflict.11 Laws against animal cruelty reflect general public 
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acceptance of the notion that humans are not the only beings who have value 
or standing. But it is more difficult, especially with plants and other non-
sentient organisms, to extend standing to entities who share less with us than 
do, say, dogs and chimpanzees. Wholes, such as ecosystems and species, pose 
even more challenging questions since not only do they lack a literal center of 
consciousness or sentience (thus possessing no interests in the sense that is 
usually thought to be morally relevant), but worse, there are no clear or sharp 
boundaries—beyond, that is, how we might carve up the world in order to 
more easily pursue our scientific, aesthetic, or material interests—delineating 
one ecosystem or species from another. Further, that which benefits an 
ecosystem or species might work against the wellbeing of the particular 
individuals within it who are more clearly objects of moral duty.    
Some philosophers, such a Kenneth Goodpaster, have argued that it 
does in fact make sense to attribute interests of a sort, and hence moral 
standing (or value), to things such as plants since they need water and sunlight 
(2008). Holmes Rolston III argues that ecosystems and the biosphere itself 
have intrinsic value (2008). Others have objected that it is not possible to 
extend standing or intrinsic value to things that are not sentient valuers 
themselves. Obligations to things like plants or ecosystems must come, J. Baird 
Callicott argues, from the perspectives of sentient valuers. Things like plants 
and ecosystems have intrinsic or inherent value only in the sense that we value 
them in ways not reducible to mere use-value; the value might reside in a plant, 
but it originates from us (Callicott 1989, 133).  
It might turn out that although the notions of interests and moral 
standing are coherent and useful in our moral theory and practice, intrinsic 
value (even in reference to people) is either incoherent or, at least, 
unnecessary.12 One approach is to note that if it is moral standing that we are 
ultimately concerned to identify in the entities and wholes around us, we could 
jettison the ambiguous and unclear—the mysterious—notion of intrinsic value. 
It is ontologically simpler to identify more empirically verifiable traits or 
relational qualities of things that make it necessary that we moral agents pay 
attention to their wellbeing when acting. There might be a variety of such traits 
or qualities, but we can, without losing important substantive elements, skip the 
question of whether their possession gives an entity moral standing directly or 
does so by giving the entity some sort of value that then entails standing. It is 
not our intent to answer this question, but to note instead that philosophers 
continue to do what they do best—careful conceptual and argumentative 
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analysis—offering a variety of approaches meant to capture the now 
widespread cultural conviction that nonhuman entities (individuals and 
wholes) have value that is not reducible to anthropocentric interests.  
From Environmental Ethics to Sustainability  
The shift in recent years to the notion of sustainability as providing the 
governing conceptual framework for local, national, and international policy 
making that integrates social, economic, and environmental dimensions is a 
clear example of the need for interdisciplinary cooperation; it is also an 
example of how environmental philosophy has broadened its scope beyond the 
axiological. The concept of sustainability is anything but settled (Söderbaum 
2008), though several fundamental elements appear in most accounts: 
environmental protection, social justice, intra- and intergenerational 
distributive justice, and democratic decision making. Such a broad concept, 
with possible diverging programs and goals, makes it all the more important to 
both arrive at a coherent and workable concept (or set of concepts) and to 
have it grow out of a more-or-less consistent collection of understandings: 
philosophical, economic, social, democratic, and environmental. At the very 
least, sustainability discourse represents an attempt to create a platform in 
which the tensions between different values and visions of the world are made 
visible, and hence subject to negotiation about what kind of future we 
collectively want (Robinson 2004). One of the ways this might occur is for 
philosophers to help clarify the various structures, concepts, and schools of 
thought related to ethics and decision making. This would involve developing a 
more comprehensive and workable model of pluralism, where this eschews the 
deep skepticism and corresponding radical relativism of postmodern 
epistemologies while allowing for a certain amount of irreducible, but 
reasonable, disagreement that seems inevitable as we seek definitions, goals, 
and policies for a global sustainable future.  
From the perspective of environmental ethics, sustainability discourse 
represents both a shift in thinking and a promising way forward—a way to 
bring together a whole host of concerns that have too long been talked about in 
isolation from one another. Most obviously, sustainability has the potential to 
overcome a rather persistent dichotomy in environmental thinking—
conservation vs. preservation—both sides of which aimed to push back against 
unfettered development. The dispute between John Muir and his once close 
friend, forester Gifford Pinchot (1865-1946), illustrates the difference between 
these two approaches. Pinchot argued on utilitarian grounds that public 
ownership and management of forests protected natural resources for long-
term use while also preventing a select few from reaping the benefits that 
should belong to the greater public. By keeping forests (and later grasslands, 
etc.) under common, public control and management, citizens could more 





wisely use their natural resources. Muir, in contrast, argued sharply against 
some of the uses proposed by Pinchot, such as grazing sheep or building dams 
in public parks or forests. He cited a need to protect nature not for human use, 
but from human use, or at least from the sort of use that would radically alter a 
natural place. These competing approaches have together provided a 
framework within which several other competing views have been (though 
not by conceptual necessity) arranged. The intrinsic vs. instrumental 
arguments, for example, could be lined up conveniently under preservation and 
conservation, respectively. Similarly, the view that human knowledge is 
superior to the unconscious unfoldings of wild nature—that we know best how 
nature ought to work—matches up well with the conviction that rather than 
simply letting natural events occur as they will, we should train experts to 
manage wild areas. Although there is an apparent complementarity between 
conservation and preservation—the former relating to the wise use of the 
environment; the latter focusing on preserving wild nature from certain kinds 
of human use—the results of their application are often different, as illustrated 
in the Muir/Pinchot disagreement. However, if we look more closely at the 
polarized dichotomy between nature and culture, we see that it is difficult to 
draw a sharp line between the natural world (taken to be worthy of protection) 
and the inhabited, humanized environment, seen as the source only of 
problems.13 The notion of pristine nature, as unspoiled by human intervention, 
has been roundly criticized, most obviously because most areas in the world 
have been altered more or less by human influences.14 
The promise of the sustainability concept lies in the inclusion of 
ecological, social, and economic dimensions under one framework, and in its 
ability to blend global concerns with the local. Nevertheless, sustainability 
discourse embodies similar inherent tensions—such as between the intrinsic 
and instrumental, or between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism—that have 
troubled environmental philosophy since its beginnings. This recognition points 
to the importance of the framing (and consequently, of the schemes organizing 
human thought) of environmental matters.  
Recent growth of a new subfield, climate ethics, makes even clearer the 
double bind at the intersection of ethics and public deliberation. Philosopher 
Donald Brown distinguishes two dimensions of the ethical challenge of climate 
change: the lack of ethical scrutiny in the realm of decision making and the 
inability of ethicists to seriously engage with direct problems arising from 
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14 For a more detailed discussion of the social construction of wilderness, see Callicott & 
Nelson (1998) and Cronon (1996). 




political contexts such as the limits of economic arguments informing policy 
measures regarding climate change or distributive justice (Brown 2013, 235).  
One of the reasons for the ethical malaise is the fact that environmental 
philosophers have tended to conduct their debates within their own narrow 
academic field. Consequently, the growing body of the ethical literature had 
little impact on informing policy making (Brown 2013, 237). More recently, 
however, work on the issue has taken a practical, applied turn, founded on a 
theoretical reorientation from analyzing abstract questions of what perfect 
justice requires and looking for foundations for human duties toward the 
environment, to working to identify ethical issues inherent in policy debates. 
Environmental ethics can contribute to improving policy making by providing 
greater conceptual clarity regarding justice, what the notion of moral 
responsibility includes, and how its components (e.g., intergenerational 
concerns) can be reconciled with the exercise of freedom in democratic 
societies. Such work, Brown points out, “help[s] policy makers and citizens 
understand the limits of instrumental rationality when science and economics 
are used to define environmental policy, because instrumental arguments are at 
the center of public policy disputes about environmental issues” (2013, 238). 
Consequently, ethical consideration must not rely only on the question of what 
ethics requires in the abstract; after all, different ethical theories may lead to 
different, or even conflicting, positions on particular matters. In other words, 
ethics can be made more relevant by focusing on setting minimal standards that 
policy proposals must meet in order to be considered legitimate options. 
Despite the fact that the disagreement about particular cases will likely remain, 
we can at least begin by identifying overlapping consensus on unsubstantiated 
and ethically dubious positions. The demand for a practical approach is 
particularly evident in the context of the limits of corrective justice to account 
for existing inequalities and the distribution of environmental burdens. From 
the perspective of environmental ethics, the question of the adequacy of 
philosophical theories and concepts when applied to urgent global problems 
like climate change is, thus, not merely a question of theoretical reorientation, 
but also a question of how to use them in practice. On this view, moral practice 
entails the ability to make reasonable judgments. Since climate change poses a 
complex and multidimensional problem, a shift in emphasis toward proper 
ethical reflection on the problem seems to be a more promising approach than 
is theorizing in the abstract. Nevertheless, we maintain, theory building 
remains an important task as it plays a role in the articulation and evaluation of 
social values and beliefs.  
The Contributions to this Special Issue 
Environmental ethicists have greatly expanded the discipline’s scope, the role 
of academic philosophers in public discourse, and the extent to which 





philosophers engage with those beyond the traditional confines of the 
discipline. The collection of essays in this volume illustrate the range of 
perspectives and approaches being brought to bear on the complex 
environmental and sustainability issues we now face. This volume includes 
work that illustrates this fact while also illuminating our understandings of 
particular problems, such as overpopulation and consumption, responsibility 
for future generations, and the resolution of value conflict. It represents 
authors from Europe and North America—five countries in total—and the 
disciplines of history, aesthetics, sociology, and philosophy.  
When environmental philosophers talk of how the field is shifting in 
ways that better relate abstract theory with real-world considerations, they are 
often talking about how their work connects to issues of policy formation. The 
discipline has certainly entered more explicitly and fully into debates about 
wilderness and resource management, restoration of damaged lands, and, most 
obviously, sustainability and climate policy. The essay by sociologist Paul Joosse 
reminds us, however, that engaging with the world of action can take us as well 
into thinking about the aims, justifications, and results of activists who may or 
may not be on board with much of what generally counts as defendable 
philosophical positions. As he points out in “Antiglobalization and Radical 
Environmentalism: An Exchange on Ethical Grounds,” a number of recent 
events—from the further commodification of our lives to the further 
degradation of both the environment and workable ways to enact positive 
change—have converged to create a new sort of “radical environmentalism.” In 
contrast to slightly older radical groups, such as Earth First!, these newer 
activists—of which Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is Joosse’s primary example—
eschew the rhetoric and aims of a narrow environmentalism in favor of a 
transnational anti-globalism and anti-capitalism. They are self-proclaimed 
“revolutionaries” challenging the institutions of neoliberalism.  
One of the worries about groups such as ELF is their willingness to use 
strategies and tactics of fear. They have used arson, for example, to destroy a 
206-unit apartment building under construction in San Diego, California. Of the 
many important ethical questions that this raises, Joosse chooses to evaluate 
the group based on three objections raised commonly against the larger anti-
globalization movement, of which, he argues persuasively, ELF is a part. The 
criticisms he deals with all involve essentially the issue of effectiveness. This 
concern is elevated in the sense that the anti-globalization movement—and by 
implication, ELF as a part—is not only ineffective, but actually 
counterproductive to its aims. More specifically, it is so by dint of the fact that it 
is preoccupied with the tactics of property destruction and mega-protest (e.g., 
against the WTO, World Bank, and IMF), and that it ignores national politics in 
favor of the transnational. Joosse argues that ELF’s willingness to engage in 
property destruction allows government and business to define 
environmentalists of all sorts as dangerous radicals, even “eco-terrorists.” Media 




similarly frames things, especially following the events of September 11, 2001. 
As Joosse suggests, ELF allows, then, powerful champions of neoliberal 
globalization to link the so-called war on terror with environmentalism.  
It is instructive to note not just what Joosse is doing, but what he is not. 
First, he is not criticizing the underlying philosophical positions of the anti-
globalization or capitalism movement. Second, he is not questioning the tactics 
of radical groups from the perspective of ethics, per se, but rather in terms of 
effectiveness. These are quite different analytic approaches since ethics is 
seemingly about more than mere effectiveness; the work Joosse has done, 
however, is of significance to anyone wanting to mount a more fully ethical 
evaluation of the radical environmental movement. Regardless of one’s position 
on particular ethical theories, most would at least care about whether the 
worrisome tactical actions (if we are to sustain a general moral proscription 
against violence) result in positive ends. Finally, Joosse is very careful to 
distance ELF from environmentalism more generally, and even from other so-
called radical groups. The account that he puts forth of the genesis of ELF 
posits the group as an spinoff of Earth First!, but as he notes, this does not 
mean they ultimately share many things in common. Earth First!, for example, 
is (or perhaps more accurately, was) generally focused on narrow concerns 
such as wilderness protection, worked largely within a framework of national 
or international politics, and has pulled back from even more moderate forms 
of eco-sabotage such as tree-spiking. Even insofar as some in its membership 
came to identify with more anarchistic views and saw environmental concerns 
as only one set within a larger constellation of concerns (e.g., social justice, 
animal rights, and antiwar), Earth First! cannot be accurately said to be a part 
of the current anti-globalization movement in the way ELF is.  
The essay by philosopher John Mariana, “Overconsumption, 
Procreation, and Morality,” is about a whole lot more than is at first apparent. 
Narrowly, it amounts to a critical appraisal of Thomas Young’s argument—
aimed at typical “mainstream environmentalists”—that procreation and 
overconsumption are ethically equivalent. Mariana contends that Young’s 
argument could be greatly improved, but that ultimately even then it cannot be 
sustained with the limited theoretical resources at hand. More widely, the essay 
challenges us to think more carefully about how ethics—or philosophy more 
generally—might better inform our beliefs about population growth vis-à-vis 
consumption and limited resources.  
In short, Young argues, as outlined by Mariana, that the effects of 
having children beyond replacement numbers has negative effects equivalent to 
those of overconsumption. He defines overconsumption as consuming beyond 
the current American average. Following an interesting discussion of the 
difficulties of defining overconsumption, Mariana spends much of his article 
evaluating Young’s replies to four criticisms that point to dissimilarities 
between procreation and overconsumption. The four objections are that 





procreation a) is the less selfish of the two, b) is a better source of happiness, c) 
involves a fundamental right absent in overconsumption, and d) creates beings 
of inherent worth. Young’s defense in light of these objections involves, 
according to Mariana, claims difficult to maintain consistently, such as: a) many 
people have children for selfish reasons, thus motivations should not count in 
our evaluation of the two behaviors, b) utilitarianism cannot be defended 
anyway, and c) nonetheless we should be thinking in terms of outcomes. 
Mariana acknowledges Young’s desire to not embrace any particular theory as 
viable, but notes that if he wants to evaluate the behaviors according to their 
effects, we do need some way of making the comparison.  
Mariana provides a possible defense for Young: we could acknowledge 
that people tend to see higher good coming from bringing children into the 
world than they do in increasing their consumption beyond that of an average 
American (wherever the line of overconsumption finally gets drawn), and then 
note, however, that no value exists independently of others. In this way, one can 
see that even if having children beyond the number needed for maintaining a 
steady population adds important value, this eventually leads us to the situation 
where resources are so taxed as to lessen the quality of life for everyone. 
Mariana points out, however, that even this stronger case for the equivalence of 
procreation and overconsumption needs philosophical support. This support is 
lacking, as he demonstrates in his discussion of what it might mean to harm 
someone not yet in existence. Mariana suggests further that an adequate 
account of the ethics of procreation must take into account our character. Is 
one selfish for wanting children? For not wanting children? Finding no clear 
way of answering these questions, Mariana closes by noting that we simply do 
not have the requisite theory to make evaluations across (real and potential) 
generations when we are unable to properly estimate the value and costs of 
procreation relative to consumption and quality of life. But Young’s refusal to 
embrace the notion of intrinsic value for individuals makes it difficult to know 
how to make sense of human (and other) interests. Thus, Young’s account 
ultimately fails; we are in need of continued work.  
Katia Vladimirova picks up on one of the difficulties identified by 
Mariana. In “The Pure Intergenerational Problem and the UNESCO Decade of 
Education for Sustainable Development,” she raises the question of whether we 
can develop an adequate account of future generations in moral thinking 
related to problems posed by climate change. She begins with reference to the 
metaphor of the perfect moral storm, introduced by Stephen Gardiner to 
illustrate that temporal, spatial, and institutional attributes of climate change 
constitute a setting that encourages moral corruption, indifference, and the 
incapacity to undertake collective action.15 Gardiner’s use of the metaphor helps 
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identify the peculiar features and normative challenges that climate change 
poses; in particular, it highlights the fact that the elements constitutive of the 
climate change problem in the context of decision making render it impossible 
to address the problem’s symptoms without questioning the underlying 
normative and epistemological questions of climate science, policy making, and 
the general functionings of society (Gardiner 2010). The intergenerational 
element adds complexity to Gardiner’s perfect moral storm, since the temporal 
fragmentation of agency makes it difficult for agents to unify and act as if they 
were a single agent. Vladimirova considers an idealized version of the 
intergenerational problem, the so-called Pure Intergenerational Problem 
(PIP),16 as a situation in which standard institutional solutions do not work. She 
proposes that instead of looking for an adequate institutional solution, we can 
try to change the very context—the rules of the game, so to speak—by altering 
the dynamics between individualism and collectivism (which in this case 
includes not only existing but also future generations). For the Prisoner 
Dilemma, the logic of conflict resolution rests on the assumption that choice is 
fully rational. This assumption, combined with a focus on self-interest as 
defining the human condition, renders any choice in favor of collective benefit 
impossible. One way to change the institutional context is to promote a broad 
value shift by emphasizing the moral considerability of future generations. Such 
a move does not imply, however, that the interests of future generations will, or 
even should, outweigh the interests of present generations. Rather, the point is 
that we should include concern for future generations as a universal standard in 
ethical reasoning and decision making. This new way of thinking, Vladimirova 
points out, must be founded on a new, universally shared value system that 
directly relates current to future people.  
The requisite set of values can be found within the 2002 educational 
agenda of the United Nations—the Decade of Education for Sustainable 
Development (DESD)—which aims at promoting values central to sustainable 
development and inducing broader behavioral and social change.17 
                                                                                                                                                           
Story of Men Against the Sea, in which the main character, a fisherman, finds himself 
caught in the convergence of three bad storms that together create the “perfect storm.” 
16 PIP is a variation of the Prisoner Dilemma in which generations do not overlap. 
17 The question of value universalism is itself a challenge for environmental ethicists 
trying to develop a context-sensitive program that accounts for historical and cultural 
factors that shape socio-economic conditions of particular places. Such programs 
necessarily rely on inducing collective action, which cannot be done by coercion or in 
the top-down fashion too often evident in global environmental policy trends. Recourse 
to universalism may pose a risk of absolutism, which is unacceptable from a social 
justice perspective. However, there is growing agreement that issues of environmental 
and climate justice cannot be properly addressed in a relativistic framework of a 
Westphalian world (that is, a multipolar world of sovereign nations-states protected 
against external influences), since moral relativism would undercut international 
solidarity in fighting against global ecological problems such as climate change. Thus, 
 





Mainstreaming values related to the environment and future generations can 
be achieved via diverse means, of which education is one of the most 
recognized. Since UNESCO is an important institution whose role is to foster 
educational agendas, it is instructive to look at its DESD in order to articulate the 
set of values that ought to play a crucial role in educating for a sustainable 
world. These clearly articulated values, Vladimirova argues, can be seen as a 
part of the solution to the PIP problem that goes beyond both technical and 
structural fixes. It does so by linking the present with future-oriented concerns 
about the environment and people, thereby stretching the scope of moral 
consideration to include future generations and allowing a shift in the balance 
of trade-offs between present and future generations away from the current 
exclusive favoring of the former. However, DESD and the values it promotes 
have been subjected to the criticism that it is just another modernization 
project supported by a neoliberal economic and political ideology. In addition, 
the necessity of nontrivial trade-offs between sustainability and development 
makes the project susceptible to skepticism expressed in many academic 
circles. Nevertheless, we would add here that it is important to note that a set of 
values for sustainability will likely not be coherent in the sense that all moral 
dilemmas related to environmental problems will be resolvable without some 
compromise on what is valued. In other words, possible value conflict should 
not be understated, and the question of how to deal with it and what trade-offs 
are morally justified remains an important challenge as we address climate 
change. Consequently, an adequate response to the perfect moral storm must 
be founded on a cluster of factors that facilitates collective action, including not 
only institutional settings, but also beliefs and value frameworks within which 
institutions operate.  
In “Building within space: Thoughts towards an Environmental Ethics,” 
historian Troy Paddock reflects on the origins and development of the 
anthropocentric, instrumentalist view of nature deeply embedded in the 
Western system of values. Since the sustainability-oriented project of 
environmental ethics needs to be founded upon a proper sensitivity to the link 
between our actions and their impacts on the non-human world, Paddock 
focuses on grasping the nature of human action and the experience of 
environment as space in which humans act. He draws on insights from 
architecture since it is fundamentally about the organization of space. 
Analogically, the instrumental, anthropocentric view of nature is precisely 
about the organization and rearrangement of space. Architecture is illustrative 
of the characteristics of human action that shape the relationship between 
human beings and their environment, as this has evolved in modern culture, 
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that would set standards for ethical scrutiny and allow for joint considerations and 
negotiations on matters of environmental and climate policy.  




which is characterized by an asymmetry that has led to the objectification of 
the environment. In order to better understand the nature of this asymmetry, 
Paddock draws from Bernard Tschumi, who claims that architecture is 
impossible without action, events, and program. Consequently, “there is no 
architecture without violence” (Paddock 2014, 83). By extension, Paddock 
continues, an asymmetry exists in the relationship between human beings and 
the environment, characterized by a kind of violence that is inherent in the 
confrontation of the logic of objects and of people.  
Paddock follows Tshumi’s recognition of the inseparability of space and 
action, where the interplay between two orders is a function of our 
surroundings as well as of actions and events taking place within those 
surroundings. He proposes that the project of environmental ethics is basically 
about balancing these two orders. A symmetrical relationship exists between 
them, where the relation of dominance (and thus violence) is minimized or 
possibly eradicated: “symmetry is connected to ethical action, and by extension 
that symmetry is required for environmental conservation” (Paddock 2014, 
84). To illustrate the point, Paddock analyses the example of the Mosel River in 
order to show how the relationship of violence in the human-nature 
relationship can be constructively transformed by changing the way we think of 
the environment.  
The taming of rivers such as the Mosel can be seen as an illustration of 
human dominion over nature, where nature objectified is something to 
conquer. However, when the Mosel River is considered as a space in which our 
actions take place, without being objectified, it is possible to practice ecological 
restoration that goes beyond techno-fixes. Such practice is grounded in a sense 
of interconnection between human agency and two orders of needs—
instrumental and generative—which come into play via inter-action with the 
environment. On this account, an “ethically wise person” acquires a debt via 
actions that serve both orders of needs. The idea of harmony with nature is, 
however, not self-sustaining. It requires a conscious effort directed to 
maintaining it, which is a corner stone of symmetrical action. The tension at 
the heart of our understanding of what nature is, and how to best frame our 
relationship with it, is grasped by the recognition of the inherent tensions in 
the human-nature relationship: “A disconnection with nature is at the heart of 
this sense of nostalgia and loss” (Paddock 2014, 88). 
Change in values and beliefs must be epistemologically well grounded. 
Further, following John Scott’s Aristotelian account of two kinds of needs and 
needs ordering, Paddock’s work makes the case for a broader framework for 
analyzing policy questions regarding issues such as climate change. After all, 
these questions cannot be considered merely as a matter of “pure” scientific 
fact, but rather they involve questions of value. Reductionism in policy analysis 
is yet another reiteration of the epistemological trap, described by Paddock via 
reference to Heideggerian modern transformation of technology and its 





relationship to nature. Actor-Network Theory is presented as an opening up of 
the possibility of restoring the symmetrical relationship between the human 
and nonhuman worlds.  
Another perspective is offered by Mateusz Salwa in “Historic Gardens 
as Places of Conflicting Values.” Salwa explores the issue of natural gardens as 
an example of human creation taking control of natural forces. Nature in this 
form can be contrasted and juxtaposed with wild nature, or wilderness. In some 
sense, gardens can be seen to be more like a human monument than like 
nature; for example, we tend to view gardens through the lens of nostalgia: 
“Gardens are always human-made; they are places where the natural 
environment is transformed according to a person’s aesthetic experience and 
expectations” (Salwa 2014, 97). Salwa explores the inevitable conflict of values 
regarding humanized nature, arguing that in order to arrive at clear answers 
and actions related to ecological restoration, it is important to make 
transparent the beliefs and values that underlie our thinking. This inevitably 
includes the question of intrinsic value. Using the Krasinski Garden in Warsaw 
as his case study, Salwa argues that abstract philosophical questions lie at the 
core of disagreements regarding garden restoration and management. For 
example, to what extent are the nonhuman elements of a garden, such as 
plantings, “natural”? To what extent are human interventions in an ecosystem’s 
dynamics justified? What kind of values are attached to a garden? Is a garden 
merely a stage for human activity? Drawing on the history of art, and in 
particular on Alois Riegl’s work on monuments, Salwa crosses disciplinary 
boundaries to undercover patterns of value conflict and the challenges faced in 
the maintenance of monuments. These patterns can be applied not only to 
monuments, but also to so-called natural monuments, including, insofar as they 
may be so conceptualized, gardens as humanly created living works of art.  
Gardens such as the Krasinski Garden are often thought of as “historic 
gardens,” and as such are defined as “timeless” in the sense that each garden 
has an original shape that ought to be preserved. The most important values of 
a historic garden are artistic, wherein all the nonhuman elements (e.g., plants 
and animals) are subsumed under the “timeless” artistic structure. A competing 
perspective sees gardens as “living areas.” The tension between the two views 
illustrates well that our understanding and ways of maintaining gardens can be 
quite diverse. At the heart of the conflict in the public debate about how to best 
restore the Krasinski Garden, Salwa notes, lies a clash between the art-historical 
and the social-ecological perspectives. His applied study and conclusions reflect 
some of the deep philosophical issues related to ecological restoration in 
general, such as are found in Robert Elliot’s book, Faking Nature: The Ethics of 
Environmental Restoration (1997). Is a garden a purely cultural phenomenon? 
A monument? Or is it an ecosystem? Should the historical or the ecological 
prevail? 




Such stark choices are not, Salwa points out, mutually exclusive, and the 
dichotomies involved need not be treated antagonistically. This issue lies at the 
core of any conflict resolution. In other words, the fact that we cannot fully 
escape the nature/culture, intrinsic/instrumental value, subject/object, etc., 
dichotomies does not necessarily imply dualism. Salwa’s claim is consistent 
with that of Val Plumwood, who points out that dichotomy, in its basic sense, 
means drawing differences, which is an essential feature of human thinking 
(1993). Dualism, however, includes also hierarchical relationships, or 
arrangements, of dominance and even violence; this is not an inherent feature 
of human thinking. Or, using terminology provided by Paddock, the 
human/nature and other dualisms are forms of an asymmetrical relationship 
between subject and object. In asymmetrical relationships the category of 
difference is overlooked, objectified, and subsumed wrongly under mere 
instrumental goals. The capacity of dealing constructively with conflicts of 
values requires that difference not be treated antagonistically. The relationship 
might then become more symmetrical. 
The problem of attitude toward difference (that is, the Other, whether 
human or environmental) is investigated in more depth from an ethical 
perspective by Krystyna Najder-Stefaniak in “Value of an encounter from an 
ethical perspective.” The environment is a physical site, but also, she argues, 
something imagined, perceived, and experienced through schemes of 
reasoning and valuing. Such space is an intermediate between the spheres of 
the descriptive, the prescriptive, and praxis. It can be altered by us in two ways: 
by changing the external environment and by developing or destroying the 
human ability to perceive and understand the environment. Thus, “the shape of 
the space depends on human capabilities and cognitive skills to a great extent” 
(Najder-Stefaniak 2014, 120). Such an account is consistent with the normative 
recognition that we need to think differently about nature while acknowledging 
the pluralism of values and attitudes that must be accommodated in decision 
making (both on the individual and institutional levels) regarding the spaces in 
which we live. The twofold interpretation of the environment, when applied to 
environmental ethics, shifts the emphasis of the discussion from fragmented 
and separated dimensions within ethics and between ethics, to practice 
oriented toward what ethical reflection is supposed to be at its roots: not just 
rules and principles of conduct, but a strategy for living that advances the 
development of the art of being. According to Najder-Stefaniak, one of the most 
important abilities in the art of living is the ability to realize encounters. The 
condition that makes an encounter possible is the existence of difference. 
However, pluralism implies many possibilities for how the encounter with 
difference will be contravened and what will result. The category of difference 
that justifies pluralism contains nothing in itself that would imply an outcome 
with no ambiguity, as in, for example, the rejection of some universally held 
belief. Rather, both the process and the results of an encounter with difference 





depend upon how difference is approached, or, to put it more directly, on the 
schemes of thinking and reasoning with which we are engaged. Najder-
Stefaniak distinguishes four types of schemes that organize our thinking and 
which determine modes of encounter with difference: antagonistic thinking 
(reflected in an either-or approach, resulting in the rejection of difference), 
complementary thinking (embodied in mediating strategies of dealing with 
paradox), dialectical thinking (allowing one to transcend the level of thesis and 
antithesis to discover their synthesis), and synergistic thinking. The latter 
scheme of reasoning is best suited to facilitate meta-reflection and 
understanding the conditions of difference and how it is constitutive also of 
ourselves. It results in creativity and enables us to go beyond identity borders 
without these being threatened. This is the condition for an ethical encounter 
in which difference enriches the participating parties and inspires the search 
for truth.  
The capacity to realize different types of encounters illuminates the 
practical potential of the ecosystem metaphor insofar as it captures an 
alternative relationship to that provided by modern dualism between subjects 
and objects. Such a move allows us to conduct a dialogue of an I-Thou sort (in a 
Buberian sense). Here, the outcome of the encounter with difference becomes 
complimentary or synergistic by means of dialogue as an ethical relation. Such 
a relationship takes place in an open system between two beings in dynamic 
interaction that are constitutive of the whole. As Najder-Stefaniak argues, “Were 
we to see relationships in keeping with the ecosystem paradigm, causality 
would no longer be linear and one-sided; we would become capable of finding 
new aspects of human interdependencies and of understanding our relationship 
with, and links to, the environment, conversely to the modern paradigm” 
(Najder-Stefaniak 2014, 119). Consequently, the scope and meaning of moral 
responsibility can be extended to include also the fact that our actions, as well 
as the way we construct the environment, influence the modalities of “gestalt.” 
Such a perspective allows us to transcend the antagonistic patterns pervasively 
framing the nature-culture relationship and discourse about it.  
Conclusion 
The task of presenting the developments, relevance, and challenges of the 
discipline of environmental ethics is not an easy one. The plurality of 
environmental discourses and the wide array of perspectives on environmental 
problems makes it necessary to select some elements of the discussion at the 
expense of others. Nevertheless, the goal of this collection of essays is not to 
provide anything resembling a complete picture of the state of the discipline, 
but to provide a sample of current work illustrating the ethical and meta-ethical 
questions and tensions that have pervaded environmental ethics since its 
origins. These tensions can be illustrated by James Proctor’s metaphor of the 




solid rock and shifting sands (Proctor 2001). According to him, environmental 
ethics is dealing with inevitable tension between subject and object on an 
epistemological level, and between universalism and particularism on the 
ontological level. Although the rise of environmental philosophy has been 
marked by naturalistic attempts to provide objective grounds for moral 
obligations toward the non-human world, the fact of the social situatedness of 
knowledge and valuing may be seen, at least to some environmental realists, as 
undercutting the promise of inducing global social change. Nevertheless, the 
challenge lies in the way we think about the multidimensional aspects of the 
ecological crisis. If approached non-antagonistically, we can arrive at an 
environmental ethics aspiring to universality (yet avoiding absolutism) while 
being explicitly context-sensitive. In other words, the project of practical 
environmental ethics is, at least in some ways, that of creating a new ethics 
(following Richard Sylvan’s earlier call (2003)) in a way that does not fully 
break with tradition but certainly goes beyond the received notions involved in 
our thinking about non-human nature and morality itself. The qualitatively new 
characteristics of the global challenges we face today necessarily lead to a 
rethinking of what ethics is, what it requires, and how we understand and act 
in the world. 
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Ethics: An Introduction 
 
 
Abstract: This article introduces the special issue for Ethics in Progress entitled 
Environment, ethics, and sustainability: Crossroads of our future. Despite four 
decades of intense development in the field of academic and professional 
environmental ethics, environmental problems pose ever increasing ethical 
challenges. The discipline continues to undergo a transition from focusing on 
theoretical questions such as what kinds of beings deserve moral standing 
toward greater inclusion of the multifaceted dimensions of sustainability and 
environmental issues and policy formation. In this introductory paper, we 
present the development, some of the key disciplinary debates, and the 
continuing and emerging challenges in environmentalism as it intersects with 
sustainability. We emphasize the importance of increasing the range of 
interdisciplinary perspectives brought to bear on practical ethics. The papers 
included in this special issue reflect both the challenges that arise as 
environmental ethics continues to expand and explore new issues at the 
intersection of ethics, sustainability, and environmental research,  and the 
interdisciplinarity required in our search to better understand matters related 
to environmental history, environmental inequalities, social and environmental 
value conflict, inter-generational justice, and ethical components of the human 
relationship with the world. 
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